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LEGALITY OF PRICE ADVICE AS A RESALE PRICE
MAINTENANCE TECHNIQUE
WILLiM J. LowRy*
The author reviews the antitrust law relating to resale price
maintenance and suggests some permissible techniques for in-
fluencing resale pricing levels.
Many suppliers and manufacturers have felt compelled to make
some effort to guide their distributors, wholesalers and retailers in
determining resale prices. From a business standpoint, such efforts
are natural and understandable. This is true because the consumer's
acceptance of prices, particularly the price of branded products,
has tremendous marketing significance. Pricing errors can result in
substantial harm, especially at the retail level, and the dealers of
the manufacturer's product may blame the manufacturer who faces
the consequences of resale prices and who may or may not have any
power to affect them.
A marketing technique of suggesting retail prices is widespread
in this country and is especially noticeable in one form or another
for most durable commodities. Color television sets, for example,
will be distributed to dealers at a discount off the list price, with
a higher discount for wholesalers or jobbers than for retailers. This
list price is an effective communication to the resellers of the
manufacturer's suggested price. By careful market research and
analysis, the manufacturer can usually determine the proper pricing
level for his products vis-4-vis the competition and the relationship
of supply and demand. The pricing judgment of the manufacturer
can be easily communicated by changing the list price. When a
list price is changed, a dealer will recognize the new price his
supplier thinks the consumer should be charged as well as the
extent of his expected margin or gross profit.
Other types of retail price communication are available and
sometimes preferred. For example, advertising by the supplier or
manufacturer that informs the public of the price may effectively
place a ceiling on what the dealer can charge because the cus-
tomer is preconditioned to the price limits before the sale. Preticket-
ing is an increasingly popular method of suggesting retail prices and
occurs when the manufacturer clearly marks the price on the com-
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modity itself. With modern packaging methods that can prevent
later alteration, such pre-ticketing may not only convey a suggested
price but also establish a price ceiling. In some industries, price is
not stated as a percentage of the list price, nor is it practical to pre-
ticket the price on the commodity. Furthermore, advertising by the
supplier usually does not include retail price advertising because of
frequent price fluctuations. Such roadblocks to the popular methods
of communicating a suggested price often occurs in low margin,
highly competitive industries dealing in staple commodities such as
food and gasoline.
Whatever the particular pattern of distribution or custom of
pricing, the fact remains that suppliers and manufacturers will
continue to strive to influence the price which the consumer pays.
Intense competition can be expected to provide the pressures for
either changing distribution patterns or at least persuading mini-
mum price levels for consumer products. Thus out of the frustra-
tion of competition comes the urgency for price advice. This article
attempts to separate lawful from unlawful methods of persuasion
available to the manufacturer to influence resale pricing levels.
There are many techniques available for purposes of price guidance.
But how does one persuade a dealer without reaching a vertical
price agreement? How far can one go in suggesting price on vertical
arrangements under the federal antitrust laws? What constitutes
illegal coercion of an independent dealer?
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES
A statement of applicable antitrust law is relatively simple.
The governing law is section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.1
In simple language, the statute prohibits any contract, combination
or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Basically, these terms are used
interchangeably inasmuch as they are used to describe cooperative
or concerted efforts of two or more persons. The precise applica-
tion of this law to the subject of price advice, however, can indeed
be hazy and confusing. This is partly due to the necessary inter-
mixture of liberal doses of marketing economics. Perhaps the chief
cause for the fuzzy nature of this area of the law is the judicial
difficulty of reconciling conflicting public policy that gives a high
priority to antitrust enforcement on one hand but nevertheless
supports long established and respected considerations for freedom
of contract and the inherent right to refuse to deal.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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Most businessmen are aware that if two competitors agree on a
selling price for their products, competition has been eliminated
between them and such an agreement is a restraint of trade. Because
such agreements invariably have an adverse effect on competition,
they are said to constitute per se violations.2 This means that such
arrangements are illegal regardless of the reasons advanced to justify
them. In such a situation, it makes no difference whether there is in
fact any lessening of competition.
In addition to horizontal arrangements between competitors,
prices can be fixed by vertical agreements. Thus a supplier and
his purchaser for resale may agree in advance on the retail price.
This type of practice is referred to in antitrust terminology as
resale price maintenance. Vertical pricing arrangements fall under
the same prohibition of per se illegality as do horizontal agree-
ments. 3 The law of resale price maintenance has developed over the
years to greatly expand the concept of "agreement". Tacit and
implied agreements as well as those that are express can constitute
restraints of trade. They also include responses to coercive conduct
where the result is the same as though agreements had been en-
tered into. In addition, there have been developed over the years
essentially three exceptions to the prohibition of resale price
maintenance. First, there are certain statutory exceptions. The most
important of these concerns state fair trade laws and the immunity
from federal antitrust laws provided by the McGuire Fair Trade
Act.4 Basically, these state laws permit a manufacturer or supplier
to specify the subsequent resale price on the theory of protecting
the value of the manufacturer's brand and trademark. The con-
stitutionality of these state laws has been judicially tested with
differing results.5 Second, there is an exception where the supplier
retains legal title to the commodities involved. Thus if one delivers
merchandise on consignment he may have a full legal right to set
the price. But United States Supreme Court decisions and the
Uniform Commercial Code have considerably limited this ex-
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
See, e.g., Schwegmana Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 US. 384 (1951);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2)-(5) (1964).
The constitutionality of fair trade legislation in Ohio is now settled. Following
the unsatisfactory result in Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 174 Ohio St. 487,
190 .. 2d 460 (1963), all doubt was removed in Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v.
Ontario Store, Inc., 9 Ohio St. 2d 67, 223 NX..2d 592 (1967). For a discussion of this
topic see Fisher, Ohio Fair Trade-Fair or Foul, 28 OHIO Sr. L. J. 565 (1967).
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ception.0 Third, there is the so-called Colgate doctrine7 The Col-
gate doctrine was based on the concept that any seller should
have an inherent right to select the parties with whom he will
deal. A supplier's refusing to deal became one of the sanctions
used to enforce resale price maintenance. But there are limits on the
right of suppliers to refuse to deal, and understanding these limita-
tions is necessary in order to find the permissible methods of giving
price advice to retailers or dealers.
II. HISTORY OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
The beginning of the legal doctrine of resale price maintenance
is found in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.8
This litigation was instigated by Dr. Miles, an Indiana manufacturer,
against cut-rate druggists ostensibly for the purpose of protecting
"its trade sales and business" and conserving "its goodwill and
reputation."9 Dr. Miles sold its product through wholesalers by
consignment contracts. The wholesaler-consignee could sell only to
those resale agents specified in advance by Dr. Miles. In addition,
Dr. Miles entered into agency agreements with retailers. The key
provision of such agreements was as follows:
In consideration whereof said Retail Agent agrees in no case to
sell or furnish the 'said Proprietary Medicines to any person,
firm or corporation whatsoever, at less than the full retail price
as printed on the packages, without reduction for quantity;
and said Retail Agent further agrees not to sell the said Proprie-
tary Medicines at any price to Wholesale or Retail dealers not
accredited agents of Dr. Miles Medical Company. 10
The use of the designation "agency" by Dr. Miles did not purport
to prohibit the passing of title to such retailers. The use of this
type of contract was widespread, with some 25,000 retailers in-
volved. The defendant was a Kentucky corporation conducting
a wholesale drug business. It refused to enter into the required
In Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), the Supreme Court clearly
subordinated the legal rights of consignment selling to the public policy against antitrust
violation involving resale price maintenance. In addition, title retention transactions in.
tended as purchase money security no longer have special legal significance in states
which have adopted the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. See, eog., 0110 REV. CODE
§ 1309.02 (Page 1962) (UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102) and OHIO Rav.
CODE § 1309.13 (Page 1962) (UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-202).
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
220 U.S. 373 (1911).
Id. at 375 (quoting from complaint).
o Id. at 380.
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wholesale consignment contract and had instead procured its mer-
chandise through other Dr. Miles customers. To conceal this prac-
tice, the defendant had obliterated carton serial numbers so that
plaintiff had no way to trace the merchandise sold in violation.
Dr. Miles sought injunctive relief. With respect to the consignment
feature, the lower court construed the agreements as an effort "to
disguise the wholesale dealers in the mask of agency.""u With respect
to the retail agency agreements, the Court had no difficulty in find-
ing an antitrust violation because "The agreements are designed
to maintain prices, after the complainant has parted with the title
to the articles, and to prevent competition among those who trade
in them."' 2 The Court also stated:
the complainant can fare no better with its plan of identical
contracts than could the dealers themselves if they formed a
combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions,
and thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with each
other.'3
Thus the doctrine of vertical price fixing was added to the lexicon
of antitrust law. Its rationale was that the resulting restraint of
trade is the same with vertical price agreements as it is with hori-
zontal ones.
In 1919, the decision in United States v. Colgate & Co. created
some doubt as to the continuing validity of the basic principle
announced in Dr. Miles.14 The case involved an indictment for
violation of section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act. A demurrer
having been sustained, the United States appealed directly to the
Supreme Court. The theory of the indictment was that the practices
of Colgate brought about pricing uniformity and constituted an
unlawful combination. Colgate used letters, telegrams, circulars
" Id. at 395 (quoting opinion of court of appeals).
"Id. at 407.
Id. at 408. Interestingly enough, Justice Holmes dissented, finding nothing wrong
with vertical price fixing. He stated in part as follows:
I think that we greatly exaggerate the value and importance to the public of
competition in the production or distribution of an article (here it is only
distribution) as fixing a fair price. What really fixes that is the competition of
conflicting desires. We, none of us, can have as much as we want of all the
things that we want. Therefore, we have to choose. As soon as the price of
something that we want goes above the point at which we are willing to give
up other things to have that, we cease to buy it and buy something else ...
so I see nothing to warrant my assuming that the public will not be served
best by the company being allowed to carry out its plan.
Id. at 412.
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and price lists to indicate to its dealers and wholesalers the prices
to be charged and to declare that no sales would be made to those
who did not conform. Colgate also sought and often received
assurances and promises from offending dealers of future adherence
to the prescribed prices. There were uniform refusals to sell to
those who failed to give such assurances, with resumed sales to those
who did. The Court stated:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom
he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.15
This is the full statement of the Colgate doctrine. It is important
to point out, however, that the Court's holding was only that an
indictment not alleging existence of an agreement or contract to
maintain prices fails to charge an offense under the Sherman Act.
Dr. Miles was distinguished on the grounds that in that case "the
unlawful combination was effected through contracts which under-
took to prevent dealers from freely exercising the right to sell,"10
The next decision in this important line of cases was United
States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc.1 7 This case involved the prosecution
of an automobile parts manufacturer for entering into price fixing
agreements with retailers, jobbers and other manufacturers who
used or sold its products. As in Colgate, a demurrer to the indict-
ment had been sustained in the court below. The case involved so-
called licensing agreements whereby certain dealers agreed to sell
the defendant's product§ with the further understanding that they
would sell only at fixed prices. The trial court reluctantly applied
the Colgate principle, but it argued there was no real distinction
between Dr. Miles and Colgate because the Colgate reseller's tacit
acquiescence in the prices fixed by the manufacturer was "the
equivalent ... of an express agreement . . . ."I" Holding the trial
court had misapprehended the meaning and effect of Colgate, the
Supreme Court stressed that there was no intention to modify the
doctrine of Dr. Miles.19 This decision stands for the proposition
1, United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
Id. at 307.
" Id. at 307-08.
* 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
'* 264 F. 175, 183 (N.D. Ohio 1919).
x, 252 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1920).
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that unlawful resale price maintenance does not require the exist-
ence of a binding contract. Building on the Dr. Miles concept,
Schrader's Son expands the prohibition against resale price main-
tenance to include contracts or agreements, whether express or
implied.
The decision in Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co.20 fol-
lowed on the heels of Schrader's Son. This was a private treble-
damage suit based on conspiracy under the Sherman Act involving
the maintenance of resale prices between the defendant, manu-
facturer of "Old Dutch Cleanser," and various of its jobbers. A jury
verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff but this was reversed on
appeal.21 The appellate court concluded that under the Colgate doc-
trine the trial court should have directed a verdict for the defendant,
in the absence of any written or oral agreement for the maintenance
of prices. On appeal, the Supreme Court again stated that Colgate
had been misapprehended. It pointed out that Schrader's Son dis-
tinctly held that the essential agreement, combination or conspiracy
might be implied from a course of dealing or other circumstances.2 -
Less than a year after Cudahy was handed down, the Supreme
Court decided FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.28 IWhile the case
was brought under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act,2 4 the tests of section 1 of the Sherman Act were applied
since the Court held the Sherman Act provides a guide for deter-
mining what constitutes an unfair method of competition. Beech-
Nut had adopted a policy of refusing to sell to wholesalers or re-
tailers who did not adhere to its schedule of resale prices. It later
supplemented this policy by refusing to sell to wholesalers who
sold to retailers who did not adhere to the scheduled prices. The
FTC had found substantial evidence that Beech-Nut had reinstated
256 U.S. 208 (1921).
' 261 F. 65 (4th Cir. 1919).
256 U.S. 208, 210-11 (1921). While reaffirming S&hrades Son, the Supreme
Court sustained the court of appeals reversal in Cudahy because the charge to the jury
wras held to be erroneous. The jury had been charged in part as follows:
[f] you find defendant called this particular feature of his plan to their atten-
tion on very many different occasions, and you find the great majority of them
not only expressing no dissent from such plan, but actually co-operating in
carrying it out by themselves selling at the prices named, you may reasonably
find from such fact that there was an agreement or combination forbidden by
the Sherman And-Trust Act.
Id.
FTC v. Beech-Nut Padring Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
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jobbers, wholesalers and retailers previously cut off upon the basis
of assurances which satisfied Beech-Nut that such distributors would
thereafter resell only at prices suggested by it. Its most effective
policing control, however, was an intricate system of key numbers
and symbols stamped or marked on the cases containing Beech-Nut
brand products. This enabled Beech-Nut to determine the identity
of the distributors from whom the products were purchased at
prices below those suggested by Beech-Nut. The key number system
made quick identification and cut-off possible. In addition, Beech-
Nut maintained an indexing system containing the names of thou-
sands of resellers and where appropriate included a legend such as
"undesirable 
- price cutter" or some other expression to indicate
that a particular reseller was to be blacklisted. It was an elaborate
and effective system.
The court of appeals was of the opinion that there was only one
difference between the price fixing condemned in Dr. Miles and the
system of price control used by Beech-Nut. In the former there was
an agreement in writing; in the latter the success or failure of the
plan depended upon a tacit understanding on the part of the pur-
chasers and prospective purchasers for resale.25 While the court
expressed its difficulty in seeing any material difference, it regarded
the case governed by the Colgate doctrine and held the Commission
had exceeded its power in making the order appealed from. The
Supreme Court, however, cited both Schrader's Son and Cudahy
and concluded that by these decisions it was settled law that a trader
may not go beyond the exercise of the right of refusal to deal "and
by contracts or combinations, express or implied, unduly hinder or
obstruct the free and natural flow of commerce in the channels of
interstate trade." 20 The Court said the facts in Beech-Nut go far
beyond the simple refusal to sell goods to persons who do not resell
at specified prices and concluded:
In its practical operation it necessarily constrains the trader, if
he would have the products of the Beech-Nut Company, to
maintain the prices 'suggested' by it ....
From this course of conduct a court may infer... that com-
petition among retail distributors is practically suppressed; for
all who would deal in the company's products are constrained to
sell at the suggested prices .... Nor is the inference overcome
by the conclusion stated in the Commission's findings that the
merchandising 'Conduct of the company does not constitute a
' Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. FTC, 264 F. 885 (2d Cir. 1920).
FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922).
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contract or contracts whereby resale prices are fixed .... The
specific facts found show suppression of the freedom of compe-
tition by methods in which the company secures the co-opera-
tion of its distributors and customers, which are quite as ef-
fectual as agreements express or implied intended to accomplish
the same purpose.27 [Emphasis supplied.]
Thus this case further restricts the refusal-to-deal exception. Having
passed beyond express agreements of the Dr. Miles variety to the
implied agreements as found in Schrader's Son and Cudahy, Beech-
Nut did away with the necessity of basing a violation on a con-
tractual relationship. Thirty-eight years later, Mr. Justice Brennan
stated in retrospect that the majority opinion in Beech-Nut dispelled
any confusion over whether an agreement was necessary to a finding
of a Sherman Act violation, since Beech-Nut's methods were as
effective as legally binding agreements in producing the prohibited
result.2 18
After twenty-two years, the subject was reopened with the
decision in United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. 2 0 This
was a federal injunction proceeding which alleged that the defend-
ants had restrained trade in pink-tinted lenses for eye glasses. The
principal defendant was the Soft-Lite Lens Co., the sole distributor
for the manufacturer, Bausch & Lomb, which produced about one-
third of the pink-tinted lenses sold in 1938 through 1940. If a whole-
saler continued to do business with unapproved retailers he in turn
was cut off. While retail prices were apparently not specified as such
under the license agreements, retailers agreed to sell the lenses
at the price prevailing in the locality and at a premium over
comparable untinted lenses. In affirming the judgment against
Soft-Lite the Court relied extensively on Beech-Nut, stating that
"Whether this conspiracy and combination was achieved by agree-
ment or by acquiescence of the wholesalers coupled with assistance
in effectuating its purpose is immaterial."30 For the first time coer-
cion was mentioned, and the phrase "to suppress the freedom of
competition by coercion of its customers" ' became a key guideline.
Any lingering doubts as to what may constitute unlawful retail
price maintenance was settled in United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co.32 This case also involved a government suit for injunction
. Id. at 454-55.
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 US. 29, 41-42 (1960).
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charging violations of sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act. The
evidence established that in 1956, Parke, Davis announced a resale
price maintenance policy. At that time its catalog began to indicate
suggested minimum retail prices. To implement the plan, Parke,
Davis informed five major wholesalers that it would refuse to sell
to them unless they would refuse to deal with violating retailers.
Each of these wholesalers was advised that this policy applied to
the other wholesalers. A similar procedure was established at the
retail level. When several retailers cut prices, they received no
further sales from Parke, Davis and its wholesalers. The evidence
further showed that the Parke, Davis plan was not completely
successful and that price cutting with respect to its products con-
tinued. Seeking a compromise, Parke, Davis sought to persuade
the offenders to stop advertising their reduced prices. The retailers
agreed that they would stop advertising if the others would. This
truce lasted for about a month and then one of the retailers breached
this arrangement. The advertising of reduced prices started again.
Instead of terminating relations with these retailers, Parke, Davis
simply gave up its resale price maintenance plan.
In his opinion for the majority, Mr. Justice Brennan announced
that Colgate did not overrule or modify Dr. Miles.88 Brennan sug,
gested that the test in cases decided before Beech-Nut was directed
toward discovering whether the manufacturer had entered into illicit
contracts, either expressed or implied, but that after Beech-Nut, the
inquiry was directed to evaluating the coercive nature of imposing
resale prices, whether or not illicit contracts were involved. This
was the crux of the Parker, Davis case. Thus an unlawful comnbina-
tion arises not only from a price maintenance agreement, but,
such a combination is also organized if the producer secures ad.
herence to his suggested prices by means which go beyond his
,2 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
Id. at 39.3' Id. at 43. It is correct that this conclusion points out an inconsistency and Justice
Brennan recognized it as follows:
The Sherman Act forbids combinations of traders to suppress competition.
True, there results the same economic effect as is accomplished by a prohibited
combination to suppress price competition if each customer, although induced
to do so solely by a inanufacturer's announced policy, independently decides
to observe specified resale prices. So long as Colgate is not overruled, this re-
sult is tolerated but only when it is the consequence of a mere refusal to sell
in the exercise of the manufacturer's right 'freely to exercise his own inde-
pendent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal'.
Id. at 44.
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mere declination to sell to a customer who will not observe his
announced policy. 34
In spite of Justice Brennan's inference to the contrary, Justice
Harlan concluded in his dissenting opinion that "the Court has
done no less than send to its demise the Colgate doctrine which has
been a basic part of antitrust law concepts since it was first an-
nounced in 1919 . . . [,]"35 and "I think that what the Court has
really done here is to throw the Colgate doctrine into discard."2 0
Harlan did not agree that Beech-Nut limited the scope of federal
control over retail price maintenance. He argued that while an un-
lawful combination may arise from other than a contractural
agreement, the Sherman Act does require concerted action in some
form.3 7 Justice Harlan agreed with the district court that Parke,
Davis did not make "the enforcement of its policies, as to any one
wholesaler or retailer dependent upon the action of any other
wholesaler or retailer."38 His basic contention was that the Court's
holding was not consistent with the district court's findings of
fact. Justice Harlan felt it was more accurate to characterize Parke,
Davis' resale price maintenance scheme as one that was "defensive,
limited, unorganized, and unsuccessful."39
III. NcECssrry FOR CONCERTED ACTioN
Mr. Justice Harlan's remarks about the need for concerted
action are accurate. There cannot be a unilateral violation of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act; that is, "concerted action" of
some kind is an essential ingredient of every contract, combination
or conspiracy. It might be argued that there can never be such
"concert" when a dealer is coerced into following the retail price
suggestions of his supplier. Indeed, coercion would seem to be in
direct contradiction to any type of "agreement". The same thing,
however, could be said of the case where a customer is coerced
into a contractual commitment. The courts have concluded that the
antitrust results are the same, and an "agreement" is present, whe-
ther express or tacit. Antitrust Chief Donald F. Turner has put it
this way:
where is a restraint on alienation whether the trader
abides by the manufacturer's stipulated resale price because he
I Id. at 49.
3' Id. at 57.
* Id. at 52.
I ld. at 55 (quoting opinion of district court).
Id. at 56.
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has contracted to do so, or because of the coercion of a threat to
refuse to allow him to purchase any more goods for resale if he
prices otherwise.
[S]uccessful insistence on resale price maintenance, enforced
by a threat of refusal to deal, involves no serious question as to
whether the concept of agreement is being stretched out of
joint to cover it.4 0
Successful coercion stands as a substitute for actual "agreement"
between supplier and dealer. Thus if the dealer reacts to coercion
- such as a supplier's threat of refusal to continue to deal or a
threat of lease cancellation - and proceeds to price at the suggested
level, he has "agreed" to do so with the supplier, at least for anti-
trust purposes.
Just as there can be no unilateral violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, so there is no such crime as attempting to violate this
section of the Act. A clear violation is where a customer has yielded
to the supplier's price under threat of unlawful pressure. The more
difficult situation exists where the coercive force is unsuccessful. It
does not seem possible to find even a tacit or implied "agreement"
if the threat does not produce the desired result. The principle of
concerted action would appear to be completely abrogated where
the sought-after result is not accomplished. For example, there was
a definite failure of the resale price maintenance scheme in the
landmark decision of Simpson v. Union Oil Co.- 1 A close analysis of
this decision will reveal some interesting points. Note the words of
Justice Douglas:
If the 'consignment' agreement achieves resale price mainten-
ance [which it obviously did not as far as Simpson was con-
cerned] in violation of the Sherman Act, it and the lease are
being used to injure interstate commerce .... 42
Simpson claimed treble damages on the premise that he was un-
lawfully cut off for not complying with Union Oil Company's con-
signment-operated resale price maintenance scheme, specifically
admitting the failure to coerce prices. Therefore, it is difficult to
understand Justice Douglas' conjecture as to whether or not the
consignment agreement mr.y achieve resale price maintenance. The
opinion of the Court also contained the following:
'o Turner, The Definition Of Agreement Under The Sherman Act: Consdous Paral-
lelism And Refusals To Deal, 75 HARv. L. Rrv. 655, 688 (1962).
" 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
4 Id. at 16.
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Here we have such an agreement [consignment]; it is used coer-
cively, and, it promises to be equally if not more effective inmaintaining gasoline prices than were the Parke, Davis tech-
niques in fixing monopoly prices on drugs.43
Note the word "promises." The Court seemed to be primarily con-
cerned with the potential evil of a consignment distribution
arrangement. Probable injury to competition, however, is not a
part of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Thus it is also difficult to
understand the following language of the opinion.
The evil of this resale price maintenance program . . . is its
inexorable potentiality for and even certainty in destroying
competition in retail sales of gasoline . . .44
The facts of the case suggest that the decision concerning unsuc-
cessful refusals to deal is really predicated on grounds other than
the implied or tacit "agreement" between purchasers and sellers.
There are two possible explanations for the Court's decision in
Simpson. The first of these is that there was a period of compliance
and hence a period of successful resale price maintenance prior to
the refusal to deal. Thus, the controlling fact for the Court was
Simpson's agreement with Union Oil to maintain resale prices, at
least for a period of time. When Simpson disagreed with the prices
dictated by Union Oil, such price fixing was brought to an end.
Perhaps the conclusion of the case was founded on this earlier,
successful resale price maintenance, with the termination or failure
to renew the Simpson lease admissible as a necessary basis for de-
termining the extent of injury.
The preferred analysis, however, is that in the refusal-to-deal
cases the necessary "agreement" can be found outside the purchaser-
seller relationship. On this basis, the Simpson decision would per-
haps be correct. Certainly, the "agreement" necessary for a section
1 violation of the Sherman Act need not be limited to an "agree-
ment" between a supplier and his dealer in the immediate con-
troversy. There is no reported court of appeals or Supreme Court
decision where the plaintiff has prevailed when the conspiracy
or combination element was not clearly established.4 5 In refusal-to-
deal cases, this element is almost always based on multilateral
action. Without it, courts have been reluctant to hold for the
plaintiff.
Id. at 17.
" Id. at 21.
South End Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 650, 654 (N.D. IlL 1965).
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Professor Turner referred to multilateral action as "vertical-
horizontal conspiracy" and concluded that if the interdependence
of decisions is established, recognized concepts of conscious parallel-
ism can be applied.4" If a supplying company makes a series of
resale price agreements, this parallel behavior necessarily involves a
horizontal variety of conspiracy. In such a situation, the approach
to a dealer is "an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary
consequences of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate coni.
merce." 47 The fact that Simpson and Union Oil Company did not
successfully engage in unlawful resale price maintenance is not,
therefore, decisive. Multilateral vertical price fixing was very
substantial and eminently successful.
Most cases of multilateral action take the pattern of a series
of "agreements" uniformly applied to competing dealers. A case
in point is Klein v. American Luggage Works, inc.48 This was
another situation where a coercive plan failed. The plaintiff was
a discounter who had been promised an exclusive dealership in
Delaware. The defendant, American, habitually specified resale
prices by preticketing the merchandise. The evidence showed that
failure to adhere to preticketed prices usually resulted in termination
of supply. The evidence also showed that American's policing of
Klein was a result of complaints about Klein's price cutting from
two large department stores, Wannamaker and Strawbridge, who
complied with the established prices with the knowledge that
American's scheme required retail adherence and carried a refusal-
to-deal sanction. Thus the "agreement" and conspiracy were present,
and this was sufficient to find a violation. On appeal, the decision
was reversed and remanded with a holding that the proof was
insufficient to establish acquiescence by Wannamaker and Straw-
bridge to the coercive pressures of the supplier.40 The court of
*' Turner, supra note 40, at 695. It should be pointed out that Professor Turner
took issue with what he characterized a "free-wheeling approach to vertical.horizontal
conspiracy" and suggested the need for a rule which would avoid its automatic applica-
tion. He summarized his position in the following language:
Conscious parallel decisions by competitors which are induced by the demand
of a buyer from or seller to the group, and which are not interdependent, should
not be held to constitute a horizontal agreement or participation in a vertical'
horizontal conspiracy.
Id. at 706.
a Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939).
206 F. Supp. 924 (D. Del. 1962).
Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963).
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appeals pointed out that the crucial question was whether the pric-
ing behavior of Wannamaker and Strawbridge stemmed from in-
dependent decisions or from an "agreement", tacit or express. The
court of appeals was satisfied that Wannamaker and Strawbridge
would have selected the preticketed prices on their own volition. 50
Hence, the decision was not based on American's threatening of
Klein but instead on whether two other customers had entered
into a price fixing agreement. If actual agreement between American
and these two large customers could have been shown, Klein
would have prevailed. Note that the necessary "agreement" does not
have to be between a supplier and complaining dealer. It can be
between a supplier and some of his other dealers or a supplier
and one or more of his competing suppliers.
A variation of the pattern is illustrated by the case of Girardi
v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., Inc.51 Defendant Gates manufactured
belts and pulleys used in power machinery. Girardi was a distributor
for Gates. Price lists were furnished to all distributors, and Girardi
followed the suggested prices until January, 1954. He then increased
his cash discount. The Gates representative confronted Girardi and
threatened cancellation.52 When Girardi refused to mend his ways,
cancellation followed. A resale price maintenance scheme had again
failed. The allegations of conspiracy with respect to the other
distributors were dismissed on defendant's motion. Gates relied
entirely on Colgate.53 Internal management letters were used to
establish the complaints made by other distributors with respect
to Girardi's practices. The court held the lower court's dismissal of
the conspiracy allegations to be error. It concluded that if Gates did
agree with any distributor to cut off Girardi and thereafter did so,
this was sufficient to cause a violation of section 1.14
In a recent case a service station operator under lease from the
defendant Mobil Oil Company brought a treble damage action,
claiming resale price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act
and a tying agreement in violation of the Clayton Act.55 The leasing
agreement between these parties disclaimed any power of control
by Mobil over the plaintiff's manner of doing business. The plain-
tiff stated that defendant's general sales representative insisted he
Id. at 791.
5' 325 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963).
12 Id. at 198.
53Id.
5' Id. at 200, 204.
Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965).
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reduce his retail price for gasoline by two cents per gallon. After
once complying with this demand, the plaintiff refused to continue
to bind himself to the prices suggested. This is another case where
alleged coercive methods failed. Thereafter the plaintiff's lease
was not renewed. Mobil asserted that its price advice was only a
suggestion for the purpose of encouraging competition. " Among
other things, the court held that fixing a maximum resale price
constitutes the same per se evil as fixing a minimum resale price.6
Thus resale price maintenance can mean maintaining low prices
as well as maintaining high prices. Mobil's representative may
have engaged in some kind of multilateral concerted action by
insisting on identical treatment for all dealers with respect to the
requested price reduction. The court characterized Mobil's plan
as a combination, presumably on the basis that it applied across
the board to all dealers.
In spite of this decision, it is difficult to find a basis for a section
I Sherman Act violation if no conspiracy or combination can be
found to exist. The "going beyond" doctrine as formulated in
Parke, Davis fails in this respect. A good illustration is found in the
case of South End Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.58 In that case no con-
certed action ,was established, -In other words, no other Texaco
distributors or dealers were involved. 'Texaco never sought or
achieved ,any price-fixing'igreement, and the plaintiff was never
asked to agree nor did he agree with anyone as to prices. The court
stated:
Since,no agreerint,is alleged, the claimed violation of §1 must
arise from acts which thd plaintiff believes amount to 'unlawful
conduct'. Unlawful conduct, however, is nothing more than a
substitute for an 'express' agreement. It does not eliminate the
requirement of showing that a combination in fact exists ....
We are not aware of any case in which a finding of 'unlawful
conduct' rests on the isolated experiences of one businessman.
[All that the record shows is that] various Texaco salesmen and
executives advised plaintiff inter alia that he was 'selling in the
wrong channels' and at the wrong prices and that Texaco was
not pleased to find that its motor oils were being widely adver-
tised at discount prices.50
The court concluded that this kind of price advice did not violate
the antitrust laws.
Id. at 349.
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
237 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Il1. 1965).
" Id. at 653-54.
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More recently, in another petroleum industry case, another
court found as a matter of law that unsuccessful pricing suggestions
were outside the antitrust prohibitions. This was the case of Quinn
v. Mobil Oil Co.60 Coercive attempts with respect to resale prices
were unsuccessful. The plaintiff claimed that Mobil began a cam-
paign of harrassment by delaying deliveries of its products, ship-
ping unordered merchandise and the like. The specific finding of
the court was that the complaint was fatally defective because it
failed to allege the existence of any contract, combination or con-
spiracy between the defendant and others fixing the resale price of
gasoline. All the court found was a "unilateral attempt to coerce
plaintiff into making such an agreement," and this does not
violate section 1.61 Both Simpson and Broussard were distinguished,
generally along the lines that have been discussed. The concurring
opinion in the Quinn case held that section 1 of the Sherman Act
is not violated by a maximum resale price maintenance arrangement
between a single supplier and a single dealer.02 Reliance on this
position, however, would be little more than wishful thinking
by a manufacturer or supplier.
IV. Tim PRAcricAL EFFECT OF THE COLGATE DocTRINE
Whether or not the upreme Court has eviscerated the Colgate
doctrine remains to be seen. As a practical matter, it may make
little difference because businessmen would not want to irrevocably
terminate relations with a price-cutter. No one wants to use the
bare-bones Colgate theory in the absence of customer rehabilitation
possibilities. As has been pointed out, in the area of resale price
maintenance, methods which are as effective as agreement and
which accomplish the same purpose are prohibited. The Colgate
doctrine is dead because it is unrealistic in any business sense. Uni-
lateral announcement of a policy not to sell to a dealer who fails
to adhere to designated resale prices coupled with a unilateral cut
off would apply only in a vacuum. Collateral factors are invariably
present. The refusal-to-deal exception may be unavailable because
another supplier or another customer insists that something be
done about the price cutter who is upsetting the market. In such
a case, refusal to deal is a result of collateral conspiracy or con-
certed action and thus is unlawful. On the other hand, a resale price
375 F.2d 273 (Ist Cir. 1967).
" Id. at 275.
' Id. at 276.
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maintenance program may be conditioned on the acquiescence of
other purchasers, in which case the unilateral aspects are shoved
aside. Indeed, the acquiescence of all purchasers in the same
trading area is a prerequisite to effective stabilization of the market.
A dealer wants assurance that competing resellers are also required
to maintain the prescribed prices.0 8
From a business viewpoint, no seller wants to discontinue
his sales to a customer. What the businessman wants is to maximize
his persuasive influence in the area of pricing standards and at the
same time continue to maintain his sales relationship. Even after
a customer is cut off in strict adherence to the limitations of the
Colgate doctrine, it would be a poor business decision if word of
that action did not reach other purchasers in similar circumstances.
The value of a termination is the potential deterrent effect. For the
deterrent to be effective, the other purchasers must, of course,
realize the threat.
V. PRICE ADIvcE GUIDELINES
In conclusion, the cases which have been discussed suggest
approaches to be employed by the manufacturer or supplier if he
is to avoid antitrust involvement. From an examination of this
body of judicial sifting and interpretation, it is possible to create
several guidelines to guard against stepping over the line into the
area of unlawful resale price maintenance. Clearly, a supplier or
manufacturer may talk to his dealers and give advice covering a
large range of merchandising subjects. In doing this, it is possible
to avoid retail price fixing.
First, the supplier should never seek assurances of future
compliance from his dealers. In suggesting a particular price or
pricing policy, meticulous care must be exercised to avoid consent
or promise. Any situation from which such consent can be inferred
is subject to attack as a vertical price conspiracy, combination or
agreement, and illegal per se. There is usually a tendency in a sales
representative towards certainty. It seems that the typical rhetorical
questions should be avoided under all circumstances. These are
" United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 46 (1960). This idea was ad.
mitted by Justice Brennan as being the crux of refusals to deal with respect to price be-
havior and conformance:
It must be admitted that a seller's announcement that he will not deal with
customers who do not observe his policy may tend to engender confidence in
each customer that if he complies his competitors will also.
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simply exercises in antitrust brinkmanship. Examples are: "You will
cooperate, won't you?" or "Don't you think I am right?" In the final
analysis, there is a simple test which can be applied. The sales
representative must come away from a price advice meeting with-
out a feeling of assurance that the dealer will comply.
Second, it is necessary for the supplier or manufacturer to
avoid a price advice scheme which involves common participation
of competing dealers. Where the law permits vertical price advice,
it does so only on an individual basis. Therefore, the supplier must
avoid such a plan or scheme. The reciprocal features of any resale
price maintenance program appear to be most insidious. It is clear
from the cases that a dealer should never be induced towards par-
ticular pricing behavior because a fellow-dealer has already agreed
to similar conduct. The result of an agreement to maintain a par-
ticular price or merchandise plan conditioned on the compliance
of the other dealers in the area to do the same is often a quick
trip to the courthouse. Common participation provides the lessen-
ing of competition that accompanies any horizontal price arrange-
ment.
Third, it is important that the supplier or manufacturer never
respond to another dealer's price complaint. Price advice is often
generated by a strong customer demanding that something be done
about the price-cutting tactics of a competing dealer. The law of
resale price maintenance is particularly sensitive to motive. No
price advice should be given to a dealer which does not originate
with his supplier. Thus the motivation must always be on the
basis of the supplier's own evaluation of market conditions. If
price advice can be traced to a competing dealer, the supplier's sug-
gestion can amount to a violation of antitrust law.
Fourth, threats of any kind against a dealer should be avoided.
Sales representatives should be charged with the responsibility of
knowing their dealers. Obviously, quantitive coercion is impos-
sible of measurement. Different dealers may have vastly different
thresholds of pain. One dealer may be so afraid of displeasing his
supplier that he sees disaster behind every visit from a sales repre-
sentative; another dealer may be so independent that nothing
can coerce him. Furthermore, there are collateral conditions which
can promote illegal coercion. For example, if the dealer has a lease
or supply agreement which is about to expire, a finding of coercion
is more likely. In any event, care must be utilized to avoid the
subtle or veiled threat.
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Under the antitrust laws today, dealers can be lawfully per-
suaded to maintain a suggested pricing standard. The law has
changed dramatically since Colgate first espoused the doctrine of
refusal-to-deal and the right of the trader to "announce in advance
the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell."04 To cut
off a dealer under present Colgate limitations would be a futile
business decision unless other purchasers in similar circumstances
learn to such action and are deterred. Nevertheless, all is not lost.
Price advice can still be an effective merchandising tool and if
care is taken can be employed without violating federal antitrust
laws.
" United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
